An extended policy brief  counting stars—The Paradox of sporadic military rank inflation in Ghana’s democracy

Executive Summary

The proliferation of Generals during the last two decades appears to be inversely proportional to military capability—more stars in command, less capacity to shine on the battlefield. During this period, Ghana’s military saw its General Officer positions expand from the relatively stable 56 positions in 2004 to 125 in 2024, while the force strength only increased from above 20,000 to less than 30,000 personnel.

This policy brief examines President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo’s decision in January 2025 to promote Ghana’s Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to a 4-Star General rank while elevating other service chiefs to Lieutenant General or equivalent ranks. This is only the second instance of a 4-Star General in Ghana’s almost 68-year military history.

Although ostensibly aimed at enhancing Ghana’s international military status, these promotions raise fundamental questions regarding the relationship between symbolic authority and actual military capability. The analysis reveals a concerning misalignment between rank elevation and Ghana’s military resources, force structure, and operational requirements. With Ghana’s military strength at approximately 30,000 personnel (ranked 113th globally), a limited defence budget of US$300 million (down 5.4% from 2023), and unfunded plans for essential operational units, these high-level promotions appear disconnected from institutional needs and current security challenges.

Furthermore, these promotions occurred without proper parliamentary scrutiny, bypassing established democratic oversight mechanisms. The Defence Minister merely updated the Defence and Interior Committee during a budget hearing about these significant organisational changes. The circumvention of proper democratic processes is particularly concerning given Ghana’s history of military interventions in politics, raising critical questions about civil-military relations and democratic oversight.

The brief contends that while military ranks serve essential organisational and diplomatic functions, their inflation without corresponding capability enhancement risks undermining military professionalism and institutional effectiveness. This disconnect is especially problematic given the unimplemented 2015-2024 expansion plans for new infantry brigades, combat support formations, and special operations capabilities. The brief recommends establishing clear guidelines for military promotions based on force structure, operational requirements, and available resources while prioritising investments in actual combat capabilities over ceremonial positions.

Keywords: Grade Creep, Civil-Military Relations, Force Structure, Military Professionalism, DI. Introduction: Contextemocratic Oversight, Resource Management, Institutional Reform

I. Introduction: Context

In January 2025, President Nana Addo Dankwa Akufo-Addo announced unprecedented military promotions during his State of the Nation Address (SONA). He elevated the Chief of Defence Staff to a 4-Star General and promoted other service chiefs to Lieutenant General or equivalent ranks. This marks only the second instance of a 4-Star General in Ghana’s military history, following Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong’s promotion in 1975. This continues a pattern of rank inflation that has characterised Ghana’s military structure over the past two decades.

The promotions within Ghana’s military hierarchy and their unprecedented announcement through SONA, rather than through established military channels efficiency.

This brief examines these issues through six interconnected analytical dimensions to evaluate their implications for Ghana’s military effectiveness and democratic governance. First, the historical context is analysed, focusing on the evolution of military rank structures since independence and patterns of politically motivated promotions. Second, the force structure analysis investigates the implications of rank distribution and resource allocation within Ghana’s current military framework of approximately 30,000 personnel. Third, the strategic impact is assessed, considering promotions within regional security dynamics and international military cooperation. Fourth, the balance between military expenditure and socio-economic security interventions is examined, reflecting non-kinetic security. Fifth, the institutional effects are explored, particularly regarding professional development and organisational reform. Finally, the governance implications are discussed, emphasising democratic oversight and civil-military relations.

Through this comprehensive analytical framework, the brief evaluates whether these promotions align with Ghana’s strategic interests or potentially undermine military effectiveness and democratic consolidation. The analysis particularly considers how these promotions reflect broader regional patterns of grade creep in African militaries, where command positions often expand without corresponding increases in operational capabilities or force strength.

II. The Concept of the “General” Rank

Understanding the significance and implications of general officer ranks within military hierarchies is essential for effectively analysing these promotions.
In Western and Ghanaian military traditions, a “General” is a senior officer who commands significant military units or formations. The rank structure typically progresses from Brigadier General to Major General, Lieutenant General, and General, with each level signifying increased responsibility and authority.

Generals serve dual roles in operational command and strategic leadership, with their authority derived from professional competence and institutional capacity. While progression through general ranks considers individual factors like years of service and leadership roles, it fundamentally depends on the military’s overall combat capacity, including force size, weapons systems, equipment, and technological capabilities. This combination of personal qualification and institutional strength makes generals crucial in defence governance, where they must balance tactical command and strategic policy while managing the interface between military and political leadership.

While Western militaries commonly use the “4-Star General” designation, this terminology has not been traditional in the Ghanaian military, where the focus has been on the progression through Brigadier General, Major General, and Lieutenant General ranks. This context is crucial for evaluating Ghana’s current shift in military leadership structure.

III. The Ghanaian Context

The Ghana Armed Forces have traditionally produced many high-ranking military officers. However, the 4-Star General title is relatively rare. Until now, however, only one officer in the Ghana Armed Forces had previously held the rank: Colonel Ignatius Kutu Acheampong, who was promoted to General and appointed Chairman of the Supreme Military Council (SMC), which transitioned from the National Redemption Council (NRC) on 9 October 1975.

Other prominent former military leaders and heads of state who held the rank of 3-star General and played significant roles during various periods of military rule in the country include Lieutenant General Joseph Arthur Ankrah, who served as CDS of the Ghana Armed Forces from 1966 to 1969 and was Ghana’s second head of state, and Lieutenant General Frederick William Kwasi Akuffo, who also served as CDS of the Ghana Armed Forces from 1976 to 1978 and was head of state during the rule of the Supreme Military Council II.

General Thomas Oppong-Peprah’s promotion on 3 January 2025 makes him the second 4-Star General in the country’s history, though it is steeped in political undertones, as will be discussed later.
Table 1 presents additional Senior Lieutenant Generals and equivalent officers who have served as defence ministers. Table 2 provides further details about the senior officers who have occupied positions in the military high command at various times (see the Supplementary Tables).

IV. Analysis of the Fundamental Factors

Having established the theoretical framework and historical context, we can now examine the key factors that should inform decisions about high-level military promotions in Ghana.

A. Historical and Institutional Context: Military Expansion and Rank Upgrades

Since independence in 1957, the Ghana Armed Forces’ structure and ranks have evolved through distinct phases, each reflecting specific political and institutional dynamics. The initial phase (1957-1962) focused on Africanising command structures, while subsequent 1983 and 1995-1997 reorganisations responded to political upheavals and institutional reforms.

A notable pattern of rank inflation emerged in 2000 with the establishment of regional commands. This restructuring resulted in widespread rank elevations of General Officers Commanding (GOCs) by Flight Lieutenant Jerry John Rawlings, JJ, from Brigadier to Major General—Brigadier General Francis Yahaya Mahama, Commander 1 Infantry Brigade/Southern Command, and Brigadier General Henry K. Anyidoho, Commander 2 Infantry Brigade/Northern Command—with equivalent increases in Naval and Air Force ranks.

Most notably, Flight Lieutenant Rawlings also promoted all service chiefs from Major General to Lieutenant General and equivalent ranks before leaving office: Major General Joseph Henry Smith to Lieutenant General, Rear Admiral E.O. Owusu-Ansah to Vice Admiral, and Air Vice Marshal John Asamoah Bruce to Air Marshal. These officers served alongside Lieutenant General Ben K. Akafia, who was CDS. Brigadier General Charles A. Okae, Chief of Staff at the General Headquarters (GHQ), was promoted to a 2-star rank. However, these promotions, particularly at the GHQ, were commonly perceived as political rather than merit-based, prompting President John Agyekum Kufuor’s administration to reverse them in March 2001 upon taking office.

Politically motivated “grade creep” persists. Historical examples illustrate a recurring tendency to restructure commands to justify rank elevations that often detach from operational requirements.
Before leaving office in 2009, President Kufuor promoted several Colonels to Brigadier General and appointed them as defence attachés. Although the promotions remained in place, the incoming administration reversed the appointments, further exemplifying this trend.

This pattern of political influence in military appointments has deepened. A notable example is Air Marshal Michael Samson-Oje’s unusually brief tenure as CDS, lasting only from January 2016 to February 2017—the shortest period, excluding Rear Admiral ARS Nuno’s acting role in early 2009. The Akufo-Addo administration’s decision to terminate the CDS’ appointment and subsequent promotion that bypassed certain 1-star officers foreshadowed the current promotion dynamics. This highlights how political interference in military affairs can disrupt institutional stability and professional advancement.

These historical patterns collectively reveal four

consistent characteristics of rank inflation in Ghana’s military:

• Use of organisational restructuring to justify rank elevations

• Political influence in promotion decisions

• A tendency for subsequent administrations to reverse politically motivated promotions

This context suggests the current promotions follow a historical pattern in which organisational changes act as vehicles for grade creep but often prioritise political considerations over institutional needs.

B. Military Structure and Rank Distribution

Regional Context of Top-Heavy Militaries

African militaries often display a disproportionate ratio of officers to enlisted personnel, resulting in degrees of organisational inefficiencies. Examples of this “top heaviness” (Table 3) arise from various interconnected factors: colonial legacies that prioritise officer ranks, militaries as political tools needing loyal senior officers, regional security challenges that require expanded command structures, and economic limitations that frequently constrain enlisted recruitment while preserving officer positions.

Other African nations, including Algeria, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Somalia, South Africa, and South Sudan, also illustrate this pattern.

Conversely, effective military leadership necessitates a competent officer corps. Excessive top-heaviness undermines operational effectiveness by creating command redundancies and diminishing front-line capability. This imbalance primarily impacts countries with limited defence budgets, where resources allocated to maintaining a large officer corps reduce funds for training, equipment, and enlisted personnel.

Three West African countries could illustrate this:

• Nigeria (2023-2024): Promoted 112 new Generals (47 Brigadier Generals to Major Generals and 75 Colonels to Brigadier Generals) in December 2023, but led to challenges in operational funding and equipment maintenance and created command redundancies affecting rapid response capabilities

• Nigeria (2024): Per its Harmonised Terms and Conditions of Service for Officers and Enlisted Personnel (December 2024), the CDS and Army, Navy and Air Chiefs will receive a bulletproof SUV or its equivalent as a retirement package, along with a backup vehicle, replaced every four years and maintained by the Armed Forces, in addition to two Toyota Hilux vehicles or one Toyota Land Cruiser, and $20,000 annual medical treatment, two cooks, two stewards, four residential guards and two drivers, trickling down to Colonels

• Burkina Faso (2023): There was a notable increase in ranks before the 2022 coup, highlighting a correlation between a top-heavy command structure and diminished operational effectiveness, illustrating how resource distribution to senior positions impacted front-line capabilities.

• Mali (2022-2024): Recent military restructuring highlighted problems with excessive senior positions and a documented impact on counter-terrorism operations that provides lessons on balancing command structure with operational requirements.

This regional context provides essential background for understanding Ghana’s current rank inflation challenges. Like many African militaries, Ghana faces the complex task of balancing command structure requirements with operational effectiveness while managing political influences on military organisation. Addressing these structural issues requires reforms prioritising military effectiveness over grand rank expansion.

Ghana Rank Distribution Analysis

The pyramid (Fig 1) visualises the rank distribution of the officer corps, which, at independence, had only 28 indigenes out of 213 officers on the Army roll. It shows an even more dramatic pyramid structure, with the vast majority (87.01%) being Lieutenant Colonels and below. This strikingly illustrates the brief’s point about the relationship between top command positions and the broader officer corps.

Typically, promotion from Colonel to Brigadier General requires 3-4 years’ time-in-grade, with similar periods for subsequent promotions. The ratio suggests significant compression in promotion timelines: 252 Colonels competing for 105 Brigadier General positions. The narrowing from 105 Brigadier Generals to just 15 Major Generals indicates a starker compression at senior ranks. This structure risks creating:

• Unrealistic promotion acceleration of to fill positions

• Career stagnation for qualified officers

• Early retirement of experienced officers to create promotion opportunities

The final steps leading to appointing four Lieutenant Generals and a single CDS position create additional pressure for rapid turnover at the highest ranks, potentially compromising the experience requirements traditionally associated with these roles. This steeply inverted structure suggests rank inflation, which likely sacrifices standard time-in-grade requirements for political expediency. It necessitates careful implementation strategies to maintain morale while managing expectations strictly per the Command and Staff Procedures (CSIP) provisions.

C. Comparative Capabilities, Resource Allocation and Military Effectiveness

The GPF 2024 radar chart (Fig 2) illustrates Ghana’s approximate military capabilities across five key categories (relative to the highest achievable percentage score in each category among all assessed countries). It highlights troubling imbalances in these categories: 55% in manpower, 45% in air power, 35% in land power, 20% in naval power, and 85% in financials.

However, the relatively strong financial position has not resulted in corresponding improvements in operational capabilities. The military’s 10-year (2015-2024) expansion plans, including establishing new infantry brigades, combat support formations, and special operations capabilities, remain largely unrealised. Although the force strength may have increased from approximately 22,000 to 30,000 personnel by 2024, this still falls short of the projected 50,000-strong force (Army-30,000, Navy-10,000, Air Force-10,000) used to justify the high command’s rank elevations.

The strategic rationale for force sizing requires re-evaluation. Rather than pursuing unrealistic expansion targets, Ghana needs a balanced force structure grounded in genuine security needs and resource constraints. A more pragmatic approach may involve a nimble force of 30-50% of approximately 25,000, enhanced by advanced technology, to effectively respond to asymmetric threats while maintaining a proportionate and sustainable peacetime posture. A 50% force size aligns with the GFP (2024) and appropriately accounts for strategic uncertainty or expectations of fragile engagements. Conversely, a 30% force (15,000) would be adequate, provided that advanced technology and a well-established reserve force are in place.

The gap between ambitious expansion plans and resource realities suggests that strengthening operational capabilities should take precedence over rank inflation. The military’s ability to wage and sustain prolonged conflict relies more on well-equipped and adequately supported operational units than top-heavy command structures. Current budget constraints necessitate prioritising front-line capabilities and troop welfare over ceremonial command positions.

The optimal size of peacetime forces, which can be expanded through mobilisation for active campaigns, should be based on a thorough analysis of strategic objectives, operational doctrine, historical experiences, and logistical capacities. This approach ensures an effective military response to threats while upholding a sustainable and credible peacetime stance.

D. Non-Kinetic Security Investment

The resource implications of high-ranking positions extend beyond direct military costs to significant socio-economic consequences. With Ghana’s defence budget decreasing from $317 million in 2023 to approximately $300 million in 2024, a decline of 5.4%, allocating substantial resources to maintain senior command structures exacerbates vertical inequalities. The cost of sustaining a 4-Star General’s office infrastructure—including personal staff, facilities, logistics support, security detail, and official residences—reflects similar patterns in Nigeria. In December 2024, the retirement package for senior officers in Nigeria included bulletproof SUVs, backup vehicles, annual medical allowances of $20,000, and extensive personal staff complements amidst considerable national economic challenges.

The diversion of resources from critical development and security requirements reflects a broader regional pattern wherein oversized and imbalanced security sectors contribute to social tensions. In Burkina Faso and Mali, the allocation of disproportionate resources to senior military positions, while neglecting community security needs and socio-economic development, has exacerbated vertical inequalities and led to social unrest. The stark contrast between the benefits enjoyed by the elite military and the limited resources available for community development has historically catalysed protracted social conflicts, as evidenced in countries facing civil strife wars.

Evidence from the Sahel region demonstrates that excessive military spending on command structures, rather than balanced security investment, can trigger or exacerbate social tensions. Well-funded community resilience and prevention programmes, which typically receive minimal funding compared to military command structures, have proven more effective in addressing the root causes of insecurity. For instance, investments in border area development projects, youth employment initiatives, and early warning systems in vulnerable districts cost significantly less than sustaining top-heavy military structures while delivering more sustainable security outcomes.

The trade-offs become particularly stark when considering opportunity costs. Resources allocated to senior command structures could support community development initiatives in underserved areas, youth employment and skills training programmes, social infrastructure in conflict-prone regions, alternative livelihood schemes for vulnerable populations, and early warning and conflict prevention systems.

Regional experiences from Nigeria and Burkina Faso illustrate how military-dominated spending patterns can create hazardous socio-economic imbalances. Effective security strategies increasingly recognise that vertical inequalities often underpin security challenges exacerbated by costly military command structures. Therefore, Ghana’s security planning must balance the development of force structure with investments that address socio-economic disparities and prevent the emergence of protracted social conflicts.

This analysis urgently suggests restructuring security investment priorities from command-heavy spending towards an integrated approach that addresses security needs and vertical inequalities. The resource allocation model should prioritise a balanced distribution between military and social development needs, investment in community resilience and economic opportunities, preventive measures that tackle the root causes of social tensions, and sustainable security initiatives that reduce rather than reinforce social disparities. This approach recognises that sustainable security necessitates addressing both immediate military needs and the underlying socio-economic inequalities that can fuel long-term instability.

E. Strategic and Operational Implications

Regional Security Context

These promotions should also be evaluated within the broader West African security landscape. Due to its size and security challenges, Nigeria, for instance, maintains a substantially larger military force—280,000 (236.7 million population)—with proportional senior leadership positions. The current regional security environment, characterised by terrorism and potential maritime security threats, requires investments in operational effectiveness rather than top-heavy command structures. Ghana’s force structure and leadership appointments should reflect its specific security needs and capabilities. Furthermore, its traditional role in regional and international peacekeeping operations demands a force structure prioritising deployable capabilities over ceremonial positions.

Now more than ever, regional security realities and dynamics are a primary factor in determining the strengths and weaknesses of forces. They thereby symmetrically influence force sizing, capabilities, and characteristics. The direct correlation between forces and other African forces represents a flawed approach.

International Norms and Military Cooperation

The government’s justification for these promotions based on international military norms and enhanced global cooperation reveals fundamental contradictions between symbolism and substance. While modern military leadership requires robust frameworks for authority, decision-making, and technological integration, these promotions solely address ceremonial aspects without enhancing actual capabilities.

President Akufo-Addo’s emphasis on rank parity in international forums overlooks the core elements that drive military effectiveness. Ghana’s credibility in peacekeeping and regional security operations has been built on operational capabilities, interoperability, and ground-level effectiveness, not senior officer ranks. The country’s distinguished record in United Nations (UN) missions stems from troop professionalism and tactical competence—qualities independent of a high command rank structure.

This disconnect between symbolic elevation and operational reality potentially undermines rather than enhances Ghana’s international military standing. True advancement in global military cooperation demands substantive investments in capability development and technological modernisation—elements notably absent from the current promotion rationale.

F. Institutional Impacts

Professional Development and Career Progression

The recent promotions raise significant questions about career progression and professional development within the Ghana Armed Forces. Although they may create more advancement opportunities at the top, establishing additional high-ranking positions could have unintended consequences for the wider officer corps. With a relatively small force of around 28,000 personnel, increasing the number of general officer positions might foster unrealistic promotion expectations and compress the time-in-grade requirements for attaining senior ranks. This risks the delicate balance of experience, merit, and advancement that upholds military professionalism.

The inflation of general-grade ranks has potentially reached a worrying juncture. Even ceremonial roles such as presidential aide-de-camp positions have become suitable for general officers. This is a notable shift from traditional military hierarchy, where such positions are typically reserved for field-grade officers. This indicates a more extensive devaluation of general officer ranks and poses a risk to the professional prestige and operational authority traditionally associated with these senior roles.

Institutional Memory and Reform

Historical patterns in Ghana’s military rank structure reveal important lessons regarding institutional reform. The various waves of rank inflation, particularly during the 2015–2000 restructuring and the current promotions, demonstrate how organisational changes can justify rank elevation. However, these changes must be assessed against actual institutional needs and capabilities. While the promotions associated with establishing the Southern, Central, and Northern Commands in 2000 represent genuine structural reform, they differ from the current promotions, which seem primarily driven by status considerations rather than operational requirements.

G. Governance Implications: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Oversight

The January 2025 military promotions highlight critical weaknesses in Ghana’s civil-military relations and democratic oversight mechanisms. The process bypasses parliamentary scrutiny, unlike in the United States, where the Senate Armed Services Committee conducts confirmation hearings to question nominees about their qualifications, views, and plans, enabling senators to evaluate the candidates’ suitability for their roles and fitness to serve in these high-level positions. In light of this gap, the Defence Minister merely updated the Defence and Interior Committee during a budget hearing regarding these significant organisational changes and the structural reorganisation. This circumvention of proper democratic processes is particularly concerning given Ghana’s history of military interventions in politics.

The implications extend beyond procedural concerns to the fundamental nature of civil-military relations. Implementing such changes during economic constraints without rigorous public discourse or strategic justification creates a dangerous precedent wherein military organisational decisions seem to be dictated by political expediency rather than institutional needs. Maintaining clear boundaries between military authority and civilian control is crucial for Ghana’s democratic consolidation. This necessitates transparent processes and appropriate oversight mechanisms rather than arbitrary executive decisions.

V. Conclusion

The January 2025 military promotions in Ghana’s Armed Forces present complex implications that require careful consideration. While seemingly aimed at enhancing Ghana’s diplomatic status in international military forums, these promotions reveal critical structural and governance challenges. With a force strength of less than 30,000 personnel, Ghana maintains a 4-Star General command structure akin to nations with considerably larger forces, such as Egypt (1,220,000), Nigeria (280,000), and Tanzania (113,500). This misalignment between command structure and force size raises fundamental questions about organisational efficiency and resource allocation.

The analysis reveals three critical areas of concern. First, the implications of force structure are particularly significant. The promotions have resulted in a top-heavy command structure, with 125 General officers (1 General, 4 Lieutenant Generals, 15 Major Generals, and 105 Brigadier Generals), primarily concentrated in the capital, overseeing a relatively small force. This leads to an officer-to-force ratio that exceeds regional norms. This structure emerged before implementing necessary force expansion and modernisation plans, which could compromise operational effectiveness. The stalled 2015-2024 expansion programme, aimed at establishing new infantry brigades, combat support formations, and special operations capabilities, underscores the misalignment between rank elevation and actual military effectiveness capabilities. Secondly, resource allocation poses significant challenges. With a declining defence budget from $317 million (2023) to $300 million (2024), prioritising high-ranking positions diverts essential resources from operational needs and non-kinetic security interventions. This financial constraint is particularly concerning given Ghana’s ambitious force modernisation requirements and the necessity to maintain adequate training and equipment standards for front-line units.

Third, the process exposes significant weaknesses in democratic oversight mechanisms. Unlike established democracies where military appointments undergo thorough parliamentary scrutiny, these promotions circumvent traditional oversight channels, establishing a precedent that could jeopardise civil-military relations. This governance gap is particularly troubling given Ghana’s historical experience with military interventions in politics.

These findings necessitate a comprehensive reform agenda focusing on eight key areas: institutional reform, alignment of force structure, professional development, resource management, integrated security approaches, democratic oversight, transparency requirements, and civil society engagement. Implementation should prioritise establishing precise force-to-rank ratios, developing merit-based promotion criteria, strengthening parliamentary oversight mechanisms, and ensuring sustainable resource allocation aligned with actual operational requirements.

The incoming administration must recalibrate these policies to rebalance the military organisation. This entails reviving the stalled military expansion programme within realistic resource constraints, establishing promotion criteria explicitly linked to force structure, and enhancing democratic oversight mechanisms. These reforms are vital not only for military effectiveness but also for sustaining Ghana’s democratic consolidation.

VI. Broad Policy Recommendations

The incoming administration should consider implementing the essential recommendations across eight thematic dimensions as outlined below:

a. Institutional Reform (foundational changes):

• Review and update military organisational structure to reflect actual security needs

• Establish a clear separation between political and military promotion processes

• Develop mechanisms to prevent politically motivated grade creep

b. Force Structure and Promotion Alignment:

• Link military promotions explicitly to force structure and operational capabilities

• Establish clear force-to-rank ratios based on international best practices

• Review and justify all general-grade positions against actual command requirements

c. Professional Development:

• Create a balanced rank structure supporting career progression at all levels

• Maintain appropriate time-in-grade requirements for senior ranks

• Develop a merit-based promotion system with clear performance metrics

d. Resource Management:

• Prioritise funding for operational capabilities and front-line units before senior command positions

• Implement cost-benefit analysis for all high-ranking promotions

• Develop a sustainable funding model for military expansion aligned with GDP growth

e. Integrated Security Approach:

• Balance military expenditure between kinetic and non-kinetic capabilities

• Invest in border area development and community resilience programmes
• Enhance regional security cooperation, prioritising operational measures over ceremonial ones

f. Democratic Oversight and Parliamentary Review:

• Establish a mandatory Defence Appointments Committee similar to the U.S. Senate Armed

Services Committee

• Require detailed justification documents for all general-grade promotions

• Mandate public hearings for 3-Star and above appointments

• Institute a 30-day review period before promotions take effect

g. Transparency Requirements:

• Publish promotion criteria and selection board procedures

• Require annual reports on general officer appointments and their resource implications

• Mandate disclosure of the strategic justification for new general-grade positions

h. Civil Society Engagement:

• Create a civilian advisory board for senior military appointments

• Consult with defence policy think tanks

• Institute public comment periods for major command restructuring

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Supplementary Tables

Table 1: Military Officers Serving as Ministers of Defence

Table 2: Military Officers at Military High Command

Of the 31 Ghanaian CDS, excluding the two British Officers, the Ghana Army has provided a substantial number of 20, the Ghana Air Force eight, including Flt Lt JJ Rawlings, and the Ghana Navy three.

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